

Message Text

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S E C R E T STATE 032638

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT LAGOS 1584 ACTION SECSTATE INFO DAR ES SALAAM
10 FEB 7
QUOTE
S E C R E T LAGOS 1584
EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF,IO, S/P AMD S/S ONLY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, US, XA
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE

SUMMARY: PRESIDENT NYRERE RECEIVED AMBASSADOR YOUNG AND AMBASSADOR
SPAIN AT HIS RESIDENCE IN DAR ES SALAAM FEBRUARY 6. ALSO PRESENT WER
E

TANZANIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. PAUL BOMANI AND UN AMBASSADOR
SALIM. THE MEETING, WHICH WAS FOLLOWED BY A BRIEF JOINT PRESS
CONFERENCE, AFFORDED AMBASSADOR YOUNG OPPORTUNITY TO RESUME DISCUSSIO
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HE HAD HAD WITH NYERERE IN ZANZIBAR FEBRUARY 5. ALTHOUGH NYERERE'S
VIEWS APPEARED TO HAVE UNDERGONE LITTLE CHANGE, SOME NUANCES DID
EMERGE, PARTICULARLY HIS INSISTENCE ON CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN
BRITAIN AND THE RHODESIAN NATIONALISTS. NYERERE ALSO REITERATED
HIS VIEW THAT IN DEALING WITH SOUTHERN AFRICAN QUESTIONS, THE U.S.
SHOULD PLACE PRIORITY ON NAMIBIA AND RHODESIA, IN THAT ORDER,
BEFORE TACKLING SOUTH AFRICA. END SUMMARY.

1. AMBASSADOR YOUNG OPENED THE DISCUSSION BY CITING RECENT
U.S. STATEMENTS ON RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA AS INDICATIONS OF THE

CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S COMMITMENT TO MAJORITY RULE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. HE SAID THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WAS SEEKING TO FORMULATE A POLICY THAT WOULD ACTIVELY SUPPORT AFRICAN DESIRES FOR CHANGE NOT ONLY IN RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA, BUT ALSO IN SOUTH AFRICA. NEVERTHELESS, THE U.S. IS AWARE THAT SOUTH AFRICA IS UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF U.S. POLICY, AND THE ADMINISTRATION IS CONCERNED THAT ITS ACTIONS NOT FORCE SOUTH AFRICA INTO GREATER ISOLATION AND RESISTANCE TO CHANGE. THE IMMEDIATE QUESTION IS WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO MOVE SMITH AND VORSTER AND, IF SO, HOW.

2. NYERERE RESPONDED THAT THE MORAL ISSUES ARE NOT UNIMPORTANT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND HE WAS PLEASED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS SEEKING TO PLACE ITSELF ON THE RIGHT SIDE. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE U.S. OFFER ASSURANCES THAT ITS POWER WOULD, AT THE VERY LEAST, NOT BE USED IN SUPPORT OF WHITE MINORITY REGIMES. HE DESCRIBED FOUR POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF SOUTHERN AFRICA:

A. THE "BOURGEOIS" APPROACH WAS BASED ON OPPOSITION TO VIOLENCE AND NEGOTIATIONS. IF THE U.S. COULD NOT HELP BY PROVIDING THE NATIONISTS WITH GUNS, THEN IT COULD HELP BY PROMOTING NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THERE WAS A DANGER IF THE ONLY REASON THE U.S. INVOLVES ITSELF IS TO STOP THE VIOLENCE. THIS SUGGESTS TO AFRICANS THAT THE ONLY WAY TO INVOLVE THE U.S. ON THEIR SIDE
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IS TO GET GUNS. THERE WAS ALSO A DANGER SINCE NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVED WORKING WITH (AND HENCE LEGITIMIZING) SOUTH AFRICA.

B. THE SECOND APPROACH WAS THOUGH EUROPE, OF WHICH SOUTH AFRICA WAS AN OUTPOST. THE WESTERN EUROPEAN ALLIES COULD BRING THEIR INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON SOUTH AFRICA, BUT THE EUROPEANS HAVE INTERESTS OF THEIR OWN, WHICH ARE NOT NECESSARILY IDENTICAL WITH THOSE OF THE AFRICANS. THERE IS A POINT AT WHICH THOSE INTERESTS CLASH.

C. THIRDLY, THERE WAS THE MORAL STAND. NYERERE REPEATED THAT IT WAS NOT UNIMPORTANT THAT THE U.S. SHOULD TAKE A STAND IN SUPPORT OF THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

D. FINALLY, SAID NYERERE, "THERE IS US". THE AFRICANS WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE NEW ADMINISTRATION SAY SIMPLY THAT IT FEELS OBLIGED TO HELP THOSE PEOPLE WHO ARE STRUGGLING FOR INDEPENDENCE. NYERERE STRESSED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE U.S. ADOPT THE LATTER TWO APPROACHES IN ITS DEALINGS WITH SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND THAT IT FEELS AN OBLIGATION TO HELP, SAYING QUOTE WHERE THAT DUTY LEADS YOU WE CANNOT SAY UNQUOTE.

3. IT WAS IMPORTANT, NYERERE SAID, TO DEAL WITH SOUTHERN AFRICAN PROBLEMS IN STAGES TAKING THE WEAKEST POINTS FIRST. THE WEAKEST POINTS CLEARLY ARE RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA, AND

NYERERE SAID THAT IN DEVELOPING A POLICY TO ACHIEVE SOMETHING IN 1977 AND 1978, OUR COLLECTIVE EFFORTS SHOULD BE CONCENTRATED ON THOSE TWO COUNTRIES. ON NAMIBIA, NYERERE THOUGHT SECRETARY KISSINGER AND HE HAD REACHED AGREEMENT ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONVENING A CONFERENCE IN GENEVA. HE HAD TOLD KISSINGER THAT TWO PARTICIPANTS WERE ESSENTIAL IN ANY SETTLEMENT: (1) THE DE FACTO COLONIAL POWER, I.E., SOUTH AFRICA, AND (2) UNITED NATIONS AND SWAPO - THE LATTER HAVING BEEN RECOGNIZED BY THE U.N. AS THE AUTHENTIC REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NAMBIAN PEOPLE. SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD SAID THAT SOUTH AFRICA DID NOT WANT TO BE FACED ONLY WITH SWAPO. NYERERE
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HAD TOLD KISSINGER THAT IF SOUTH AFRICA'S PROBLEM WAS ONE OF SAVING FACE, THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE TURNHALLE CONFERENCE COULD ALSO BE INCLUDED AS PART OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN DELEGATION. UN SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM COULD NO INVITE THE TURNHALLE PARTICIPANTS SINCE THEY DID NOT EXERCISE CONTROL IN NAMIBIA. IF SWAPO WANTED, IT COULD ALSO INCLUDE OTHERS IN THE DELEGATION. NYERERE SAID KISSINGER HAD WRITTEN HIM ON OCTOBER R TO SAY THAT THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR CONVENING THE CONFERENCE IN GENEVA HAD BEEN MET.

4. NYERERE ADMITTED THAT SWAPO HAD SUBSEQUENTLY RAISED OTHER CONDITIONS, BUT HE STATED THAT THESE WERE NHH NEW. AS LONG AS THE ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS WERE MET, SWAPO, WAS PREPARED TO COMPROMISE ON THE OTHER QUESTIONS. NYERERE SAID HE HAD HOPED THAT ONCE THESE ISSUES WERE RESOLVED, KISSINGER WOULD TELL WALDHEIM TO CALL THE CONFERENCE. THE FACT THAT THE CONFERENCE HAD NO BEEN CALLED DESPITE APPARENT AGREEMENT ON THE ARRANGEMENTS SUGGESTED TO NYERERE THAT SOUTH AFRICA HAD REALLY BEEN NOT PREPARED TO ENTERTAIN THE IDEA OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

5. AMBASSADOR SPAIN INTERRUPTED TO CLARIFY THE DETAILS OF THE KISSINGER PROPOSALS. SOUTH AFRICA HAD ACCEPTED THE IDEA OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AT WHICH ALL THE PARTIES WOULD BE REPRESENTED, INCLUDING THE UN. SOUTH AFRICA HAD AGREED TO HAVE ITS REPRESENTATIVE PRESENT TO DISCUSS THOSE ISSUES THAT CONCERNED THEM, I.E., TROOP WITHDRAWALS AND THE STATUS OF WALVIS BAY.. IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT THE UN PRESENCE AT THE CONFERENCE WOULD BE WHATEVER WAS SATISFACTORY TO WALDHEIM. NYERERE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOUTH AFRICA'S ACCEPTANCE THAT THE CONFERENCE WOULD BE HELD IN UN BUILDINGS IN GENEVA AND PAID FOR BY THE UN WOULD APPEAR TO SATISFY THE CONDITION THAT THE CONFERENCE TAKE PLACE "UNDER UN AUSPICES." NYERERE SAID HE WAS QUITE SATISFIED WITH THOSE ARRANGEMENTS.

6. WITH REGARD TO RHODESIA, NYERERE STRESSED THAT THE
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NEGOTIATIONS WHOULD CONTINUE. THE BRITISH SHOULD RESUME DISCUSSIONS ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT WITH THE NATIONISTS AND TRY TO REACH AGREEMENT AMONG THEMSELVES. ASKED WHETHER A MEETING OF THE NATIONALISTS, THE FRONT LINE PRSIDENTS AND U.S.-UK REPRESENTATIVES MIGHT BE USEFUL IN THIS REGARD, NYERERE RESPONDED THAT SUCH A MEETING SEEMED PREMATURE AND MIGHT RAISE FALSE HOPES. IT IS IMPORTANT FIRST TO NARROW THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND THE NATIONISTS. ONCE THIS HAS BEEN DONE THE U.S. SHOULD COME IN, NOT SO MUCH TO SUPPORT THE BRITISH IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH THE NATIONALISTS, BUT WITH A SEPARATE INITIATIVE TO GET THE PROPOSALS ACCEPTED BY ALL PARTIES.

7. AMBASSADOR SPAIN COMMENTED THAT THE PROCESS OF WORKING OUT THE PROPOSALS COULD NOT BE TOTALLY UNCONNECTED TO EFFORTS TO GAT SMITH TO ACCEPT THEM. NYERERE'S ONLY RESPONSE WAS THAT THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS WOULD BE PREPARED TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE NATIONALISTS AND, WORKING WITH THE BRITISH, WOULD SUCCEED IN GETTING FROM THEM A REASONABLE AGREEMENT.

8. NYERERE WAS ASKED WHAT STEPS THE U.S. MIGHT TAKE WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH AFRICA. HE SUGGESTED THA THE U.S. MIGHT TRY THE COMBINATION OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES SUGGESTED BY AMBASSADOR YOUNG, BUT EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE RESULTS. THE CONTEXT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION IS DIFFERENT. HE RECALLED THAT VORSTER HAD SUPPORTED HITLER DURING WORLD WAR II AND THAT SOUTH AFRICAN WHITES WERE AN ENTRENCHED MINORITY THAT WAS NOT ABOUT TO GIVE UP POWER. HE DOUBTED THAT ANYONE, CERTAINLY NOT VORSTER, WOULD BE PREPARED TO MOVE IN THAT DIRECTION. ONE COULD NOT FORESEE THE NEXT MOVES IN SOUTH AFRICA AS CLEARLY AS ONE COULD IN NAMIBIA AND RHODESIA.

9. AMBASSADOR YOUNG TOLD NYERERE OF RECENT INDICATIONS THE U.S. HAS RECEIVED THAT SOUTH AFRICA MIGHT BE WILLING TO ELIMINATE SOME ASPECTS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND PETTY APARTHEID. IN
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RETURN, HOWEVER, THE SOUTH AFRICANS APPARENTLY WERE SEEKING SOME U.S. RECOGNITION OF THESE PROPOSED LIBERALIZATIONS. NYERERE RESPONDED THAT WHAT SOUTH AFRICA APPEARED TO BE OFFERING WAS TO LITTLE. IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO GET THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO MAKE EVEN MINOR CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, SUCH AS GRANTING EVEN A LIMITED FRANCHISE TO BLACKS, THIS WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT. IT WOULD MEAN A CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA'S IDEOLOGY OF APARTHEID AND WOULD OFFER HOPE FOR THE FUTURE. NYERERE SAID THAT SUCH CHANGES IN THE RHODESIA CONTEXT WERE ALREADY TOO LITTLE AND TOO LATE, BUT THEY WOULD BE MEANINGFUL IF MADE IN SOUTH AFRICA.

10. NYERERE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT WOULD BE SUICIDAL FOR AFRICAN COUNTRIES BORDERING ON SOUTH AFRICA TO ATTEMPT GUERRILLA WARFARE

AND THAT POLITICAL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA WOULD HAVE TO TAKE
A DIFFERENT FORM BECAUSE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S MILITARY STRENGTH.
HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO THE U.S. USING COMBINATION OF POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES TO BOOST CHANGES IN SOUTH AFRICA. BUT,
HE SAID, "LET'S GET RHODESIA AND NKAMIBIA OUT OF THE WAY FIRST."
ONCE THIS IS DONE, THE NEXT PRIORITY SHOULD BE TO HELP THOSE
COUNTRIES BORDERING SOUTH AFRICA TO MAKE THEIR INDEPENDENCE
REAL. THAT PLUS VORSTER'S RIGID POLICIES WOULD INEVITABLY
BRING ABOUT CONDITIONS LEADING TO FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN SOUTH
AFRICA.

11. EMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM MAY WISH TO COMMENT ON NYERER'S
VIEWS.
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